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Introduction
One of  the most striking features of  judicial review in the UK is the extent to whichthe term ‘the public interest’ is used by the courts when resolving different points of
law. Historically, use of  the term can perhaps be traced to the doctrine of  public interest
immunity that suffused the earlier conception of  Crown privilege,1 but it is since the
procedural reforms of  the late 1970s that the term has become almost a constant within
the case law.2 At one level, this has been a direct consequence of  the reforms themselves,
as aspects of  the judicial review procedure have been said to safeguard the broader public
interest in efficient public administration.3 But there has been a range of  other factors that
have equally led to an increased use of  the term, whether in relation to procedural law or
substantive law. These have included ongoing development of  a common law principle of
legality that emphasises the public interest in vindicating the rule of  law in any case in
which a public authority has acted unlawfully.4 Also relevant have been European
standards on the limitation of  fundamental rights, as well as international instruments like
the Aarhus Convention that binds the UK and European Union (EU) on the shared matter
of  the environment.5
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inaugural lecture delivered at Queen’s on 15 November 2012. My thanks are due to various colleagues and
friends who commented upon earlier versions of  the text: Jack Anderson, Pat Birkinshaw, Brice Dickson,
Olivier Dubos, Carol Harlow, Tom Hickman, Peter Leyland, Kieran McEvoy, John Morison and Ting Xu. My
thanks are also due to Leanne Cochrane who worked as a research assistant on an earlier Economic and Social
Research Council-funded project that the article draws upon (The Public Interest in UK Courts: RES-062-23-
1996). The responsibility for any errors is mine.
1 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910; Rogers v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [1973] AC 388; and Al Rawi v
Security Service [2011] UKSC 34, [2012] 1 AC 531.
2 On the reforms see H W R Wade and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th edn, OUP 2009), ch 18.
3 See Lord Woolf, Protection of  the Public: A New Challenge (Steven & Sons 1990) 12–15; and, regarding delay,
O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 and eg Re Quinn’s Application for Leave [2010] NIQB 100 [14].
4 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of  Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617,
644, Lord Diplock. On the common law principle, see J Jowell, ‘The Rule of  Law and its Underlying Values’
in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (7th edn, OUP 2011) ch 1. 
5 The text of  the Aarhus Convention is available at <www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf>.
Such increased references to the public interest reflect a constitutional reality that often
places judicial review at the intersection of  national, supranational and international legal
norms. Although individual cases will inevitably be specific to their own facts and law, it is
axiomatic that the wider body of  judicial review case law now has three main dimensions –
common law, European law, international law – and that these can coincide in particular
cases. Where there is such coincidence, the courts may refer to the public interest as it is
conceived of  by the common law or by European law and/or international law. While such
references can raise difficult questions about the nature of  the public interest that is being
appealed to – questions that become more complex when European law or international
law is in issue – they provide a clear example of  how far modern judicial review must
accommodate different (and sometimes competing) legal norms. They also suggest that
there is a need for nuance when considering the common law principle of  legality that links
the public interest to the rule of  law, as the applicable legal norms will sometimes have been
formulated at the European or international levels. 
The corresponding aim of  this article is to illustrate how references to the public interest
can traverse the three dimensions of  judicial review and to identify a conceptual framework
for understanding those references. At the level of  illustration, the article focuses on the
example of  public interest litigation whereby pressure groups, representative bodies and
statutory organisations can enjoy liberal access to courts for purposes of  bringing
proceedings in their own names or intervening as third parties in ongoing disputes.6
Although the genesis of  public interest litigation in the UK courts lies very much in the
common law dimension of  judicial review, it will be seen that European law and
international law now also make demands about liberal access to the courts for a range of
(not always connected or complementary) reasons. This is thus one area where there is a
pronounced interaction of  norms, and the article suggests that that interaction can be
understood as an outworking of  ‘global administrative law’.7 According to the global
administrative law thesis, national courts are directly and indirectly involved in a number of
legal networks that pursue accountability as a core value in contemporary global
governance. While the thesis was originally concerned with the development of  legal
principles in an administrative space above the level of  the state, it is now also associated
with a global legality principle that is defined by a pluralist interaction of  national,
supranational and international legal orders.8 The article uses that thesis to examine
instances of  the intersection of  norms in public interest litigation, where common law
approaches to procedure have been key to facilitating the demands of  European law and/or
international law. The article likewise draws upon the idea of  an emerging global legality
principle to contextualise some UK court rulings on the substantive issues that have arisen
in public interest cases, for instance, on the protection of  fundamental rights and the limits
to the discretion that may be exercised by public decision makers. 
The analysis begins with a section that considers some of  the different meanings of  the
public interest and the various ways in which the UK courts may refer to the term. It then
considers the example of  public interest litigation and, in that setting, the nature of  the
common law, European law and international law dimensions to judicial review. The final
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(2)126
6 Axa General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868; Re E (A Child) [2008] UKHL 66,
[2009] 1 AC 536; and eg M Kirby, ‘Deconstructing the Law’s Hostility to Public Interest Litigation’ (2011) 127
LQR 537. 
7 B Kingsbury, N Krisch and R Stewart, ‘The Emergence of  Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and
Contemporary Problems 15. 
8 J-B Auby, La globalisation, le droit et l’État (2nd edn, Montchestien 2010). 
section and the conclusion develop the point about the analytical worth of  global
administrative law and the interface between the public interest and the principle of  legality. 
Locating ‘the public interest’
Perhaps the first – self-evident – point that should be made about the public interest is that
it is a concept that lacks precise definition and which has been the subject of  polarised debate
about its meaning and content.9 Although there have inevitably been a number of  strands to
the debate, the prevailing theme has been the legitimacy or otherwise of  a presumed political
community with shared values such as sustains the public interest. For instance,
commentators who have been critical of  the concept have noted the artificiality of  ideas of
political community and so on when suggesting that the concept has ‘fundamentally
undemocratic’ implications for autonomous individuals.10 The argument here has been that
the public interest is anti-libertarian in thrust as it can result in the otherwise valid preferences
of  individuals being subjected to those of  falsely constructed majority communities.11
However, such concerns about majoritarianism have been countered by alternative models
that adopt a communitarian logic when accommodating individual interests within those of
wider society.12 While such modelling has begged obvious questions about how to gauge the
public interest within polities that have a variety of  cross-cutting individual and sectional
interests, as well as those that may appear irreconcilable, it has nevertheless emphasised the
existence of  complementary interests among members of  society. Answers to the obvious
questions have therefore been found in ‘preponderance’, ‘unitary’ and ‘common interest’
theories that situate individual interests within that of  a broader collective and emphasise the
normative worth of  the public interest.13
A further approach has centred upon the public interest as procedural in form. For
Bozeman, writing about the interconnection between public values and the public interest,
this approach marks the compromise position of  those who could not ‘accept a normative
view of  public interest but [were] not ready to altogether abandon the concept’.14
Elemental to this approach is an understanding that the virtue of  government lies not in
its assumed ability to represent shared values but rather in ‘the multiplicity of  points of
access it affords for the manifold conflicting interests which necessarily arise’ in society.15
Government, on this approach, is therefore about reconciling interests through
deliberation and debate and about having procedures that can yield agreed – or certainly
acceptable – policies and outcomes. Indeed, while an emphasis on procedure also raises
doubts about majoritarianism16 and about how to ensure coherent reasoning in respect of
substantive choices,17 the procedural approach recognises that individuals necessarily
interact with one another within the framework of  broader society. On this view, the public
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9 For overviews of  the debates, see B Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest (Georgetown UP 2007) ch 1;
R C Box, ‘Redescribing the Public Interest’ (2007) 44 Social Science Journal 585; M Feintuck, The ‘Public
Interest’ in Regulation (OUP 2004) ch 1; and V Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (Basic Books 1970). 
10 The term was used by H R Smith: see Democracy and the Public Interest (University of  Georgia Press 1960) 27.
11 A balance that led some to argue for the abolition of  the term: see eg C E Cochran, ‘Political Science and
“The Public Interest”’ (1974) 36 Journal of  Politics 327.
12 See generally Held (n 9).
13 Ibid.
14 Bozeman (n 9) 93.
15 G A Schubert, The Public Interest: A Critique of  the Theory of  a Political Concept (Glencoe Free Press 1960) 136.
16 A Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice (Routledge 2007)
especially chs 7 and 8.
17 See J Bell, ‘Public Interest: Policy or Principle’ in R Brownsword (ed), Law and the Public Interest (Franz Steiner
Verlag 1993) 30.
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interest is what emerges from deliberative processes that occur within democratically
legitimated institutions.18
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of  such models, they permeate various well-
known features of  UK public law. This is true, for example, of  the procedural approach and
the UK constitution’s emphasis on representative democracy.19 Although other (written)
constitutions may note the nexus between ‘the people’ and ‘the State’20 – the latter being
the ‘formal expression and visible symbol of  the “public interest”’21 – UK constitutional
law has historically lacked such theorising and has centred, instead, on the place of  the
Crown and its relationship with the Westminster Parliament.22 This has led to some
discussion about the nature of  the interests that the Crown itself  can represent,23 but it has
also, and more famously, resulted in the Westminster Parliament’s elevation to a position of
unique prominence within the constitution.24 Moreover, while it is true that the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty no longer enjoys unqualified judicial support25 – causal
considerations include devolution, Europeanisation and globalisation – the doctrine
remains sourced in the idea that the Westminster Parliament is legally sovereign because its
authority derives from the legitimating force of  the electorate.26 Seen in this way, the
Westminster Parliament becomes a deliberative forum that brings together the competing
interests within society; reconciles those interests through the legislative process; and
consolidates the accepted outcomes in Acts that the courts regard as sovereign.
Appeals to ideas of  ‘community’ can then be found in much of  administrative law. At
one level, this might be thought inevitable given the functions that administrative law is
sometimes said to perform. Although the absence of  a state tradition entails that UK law
here too is significantly different from some other legal orders,27 the body of  administrative
law that developed in the previous century was argued, by some, to centre upon the
reinvention of  society through the provision of  public goods.28 This, famously, is the realm
of  Harlow and Rawlings’ ‘green-light’ theory of  administrative law and it corresponds, at its
height, with an understanding that public authorities exercise power on the basis of
‘considerate altruism’.29 Such altruism requires public bodies to consider the interests of
individuals affected by their decisions, but it also, and just as importantly, means that ‘public
bodies have no rights or interests of  their own and must exercise their powers . . . for the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(2)
18 See further I O’Flynn, ‘Deliberating about the Public Interest’ (2010) 16(3) Res Publica 299.
19 See generally P Leyland, The Constitution of  the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis (2nd edn, Hart Publishing
2012) ch 5.
20 See eg Arts 4–11 of  the Irish Constitution, 1937; and D Clarke, ‘Nation, State and Nationality in the Irish
Constitution’ (1998) 16 ILT 252.
21 The term is W Friedmann’s: see ‘The Changing Content of  Public Interest: Some Comments on Harold D
Lasswell’ in C J Friedrich (ed), Nomos V: The Public Interest (Atherton Press 1967) 80, 84. 
22 N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (OUP 1999) ch 3.
23 See eg M Loughlin, ‘The State, the Crown and the Law’ in M Sunkin and S Payne (eds), The Nature of  the Crown:
A Legal and Political Analysis (OUP 1999) 33; and T Nairn, The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy (Radius
1988).
24 J Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (OUP 2010); and The Sovereignty of  Parliament:
History and Philosophy (OUP 1999). Compare V Bogdanor, ‘Imprisoned by a Doctrine: The Modern Defence
of  Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2012) 32 OJLS 179.
25 R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262, 302 [102], Lord Steyn.
26 P Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and United States of  America (OUP 1990), ch 2.
27 J Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on English Public Law
(OUP 2000).
28 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn, CUP 2009), 31–37.
29 D Oliver, Common Values and the Public–Private Divide (Butterworths 1999) 5.
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general good’.30 The prevailing imagery is therefore of  public bodies acting for the good of
society as a whole and in the pursuit of  only ‘lawful and relevant grounds of  public
interest’.31 Indeed, it is for this reason that strict procedural requirements in judicial review
have been said to be justified, as they are understood to provide a heightened degree of
certainty in public administration that thereby benefits society as a whole.32 The courts have
similarly referred to the ‘interests of  the community’ when justifying, on grounds of  ‘public
policy’, a restrictive and remarkably durable line of  case law on the negligence liability of
public authorities.33
‘Red-light’, or ‘control’, theories of  administrative law also make mention of  the public
interest, although uses of  the term here can vary.34 At their core, such theories posit that the
sovereign legislature has entrusted public authorities with power and that the primary
function of  administrative law is to ensure that the exercise of  such power observes the
limits set by Parliament.35 This originally meant that control was synonymous with the ultra
vires doctrine, but the courts have long since extended public law protections into the non-
statutory field in disputes that have involved ‘a matter of  public interest in the sense that
[they have] an impact on the public generally and not merely on an individual or group’.36
This has been one aspect of  the much commented upon expansion of  the common law
since the 1960s,37 which has also involved increased recognition and protection of  common
law fundamental rights.38 That protection initially took the form of  ‘anxious scrutiny’ of
executive decisions but it is now largely governed by the complementary principles that have
emerged under the Human Rights Act 1998.39 Prominent among these is the idea that there
is a ‘public interest’ in recognising individual rights as this gives the law a normative
grounding that can act as a brake on the abuse of  governmental power.40 However, also
prominent is a line of  reasoning that accepts that proportionate limitations may be placed
upon qualified rights where the limitations pursue a legitimate ground of  public interest
within the meaning of  the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (for instance,
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30 Oliver (n 29); and see further D Oliver, ‘Psychological Constitutionalism’ (2010) 69 CLJ 639, 640–44. But
compare M Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse UP 1986). 
31 R v Tower Hamlets LBC, ex p Chetnik Developments [1988] AC 858, 872, Lord Bridge, quoting W Wade,
Administrative Law (5th edn, OUP 1982) 355–56. See also M Elliott, ‘Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and
Purposes: Joining the Dots’ [2012] NZLR 75, 79.
32 Woolf  (n 3) 12–15.
33 Eg Brooks v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495, 1510, Lord Steyn. See, to
similar effect, Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, [2009] 1 AC 874; Jain v Trent SHA [2009]
UKHL 4, [2009] 1 AC 853; Van Colle v Chief  Constable of  Hertfordshire; Smith v Chief  Constable of  Sussex [2008]
UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225; D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC
373; Gorringe v Calderdale MBC [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057; and Hill v Chief  Constable of  West Yorkshire
[1989] AC 53. But compare Smith, Ellis and Allbutt v MOD [2013] UKSC 41.
34 On red-light theory, see Harlow and Rawlings (n 28) 22–25. 
35 See P Craig, Administrative Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 4–16. 
36 Re McBride’s Application [1999] NI 299, 310, Kerr J. See further G Anthony, Judicial Review in Northern Ireland
(Hart Publishing 2008) 40–42. 
37 See eg C F Forsyth (ed), Judicial Review and the Constitution (Hart Publishing 2000).
38 M Fordham, ‘Common Law Rights’ [2011] 16 JR 14. 
39 Bugdaycay v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, 531, Lord Bridge; T Hickman, Public Law
after the Human Rights Act (Hart Publishing 2010); and B Dickson, Human Rights and the UK Supreme Court (OUP
2013) ch 2. 
40 See eg Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper Ltd [1993] AC 534 discussing the public interest in freedom of
expression. On rights and the abuse of  power see Craig (n 35) 16–27. 
national security, public order, health or morals etc).41 Such reasoning, which has some
parallel under the derogation provisions of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European
Union (TFEU)42 and in the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights,43 again appeals to the
imagery of  community by noting that ‘the fundamental rights of  individuals are of  supreme
importance but . . . are not unlimited: we live in communities of  individuals who also have
rights’.44 There is, in the result, a dual use of  the public interest in rights discourse that carries
a presumption in favour of  rights but which acknowledges ‘the duties of  everyone to the
community and . . . [the need] . . . to secure and protect respect for the rights of  others’.45
Attempts to balance the rights of  individuals with those of  the community can,
however, lead to criticisms of  majoritarianism, for instance, where the balance is too often
struck in favour of  the community or, more pointedly, legislative or executive choices.46
Here, the common law has previously sought to protect individuals by noting that their
rights can intersect with the interests of  third parties and that those third-party interests, in
turn, may form part of  the broader public interest.47 Such complementarity of  interests
suggests a high degree of  nuance in judicial reasoning, but it must nevertheless cede, in a
concrete dispute, to a choice between the rights of  the individual and the interests of  the
wider public. Faced with that choice, it is well known that courts will regard the context to
a dispute as ‘everything’ and that the balance to be struck will depend on the rights that are
involved and the type of  decision or act that affects them.48 To borrow from Laws LJ’s
much-cited judgment in International Transport Roth, the courts can thus be expected to be
more interventionist where individual rights are stated in terms that are unqualified and
where the decision under challenge has been taken by an unelected official or even a
minister who is also answerable to a legislature.49 However, where the choice is that of  the
legislature itself  - whether at Westminster or at the devolved levels – judicial restraint may,
though not necessarily will, be writ large.50
Of  course, the scope for challenges to legislative choices, or certainly those of  the
Westminster Parliament, is one of  the most prominent out-workings of  the European law
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(2)130
41 See, illustratively, Arts 8-11 ECHR. But see A McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest:
Conceptual Problems and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of  the European Court of  Human
Rights’ (1999) 62 MLR 671. 
42 Eg Art 36 TFEU: ‘The provisions of  Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of  public morality, public policy or public security;
the protection of  health and life of  humans, animals or plants; the protection of  national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of  industrial and commercial property. Such
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of  arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States.’
43 Viz. in Art 52. On the Charter’s status and reach in UK law see Case C-411/10, NS v Home Secretary [2012] 2
CMLR 9 and eg Rugby Football Union v Viagogo Ltd [2012] UKSC 55; [2012] 1 WLR 3333.
44 Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 707–08, Lord Steyn.
45 Ibid.
46 See Re P [2008] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 AC 173; and eg L Lustgarten and I Leigh, In from the Cold: National Security
and Parliamentary Democracy (Clarendon Press 1994). For a critical analysis of  early case law under the Human
Rights Act 1998, see R A Edwards, ‘Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 65 MLR 859.
47 Singh v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1986] 1 WLR 910.
48 R v Home Secretary, ex p Daly [2001] UKHL 25; [2001] 2 AC 532, 548, Lord Steyn
49 International Transport Roth GmbH v Home Secretary [2003] QB 728, 765ff. 
50 Ibid; and see James v UK (1986) 8 EHRR 123, 142, ECtHR recognising in the context of  legislation interfering
with property rights that ‘the notion of  “public interest” is necessarily extensive’. See also Axa General Insurance
Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [2012] 1 AC 868. But, for an instance of  intervention, see R (F) v Secretary
of  State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17, [2011] 1 AC 331 (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 82, declared
incompatible with Art 8 ECHR).
dimension of  judicial review.51 The significance of  that dimension is examined in more
detail below, but the point to be noted at this stage is that challenges to the public interest
choices of  the Westminster Parliament, at least within the procedural meaning of  the term,
are underpinned by norms that have been defined in other deliberative and judicial fora.
While this begs the question of  the model of  the public interest that predominates in those
fora – there have historically been concerns about the quality of  deliberation in the EU
institutions52 – the intersection of  norms nevertheless means that the choices of  the
Westminster Parliament no longer automatically prevail (at least within the context of  EU
membership).53 That reality has since led to the European Union Act 2011 that refines the
basis of  EU membership, but, even though the Act modifies the mechanisms for further
transfers of  power to the EU, it does nothing to limit the current reach of  EU law or,
indeed, the common law’s ascription of  primacy to it.54 More tellingly, some commentators
have doubted whether it is even feasible to ring-fence national powers in the manner
envisaged by the European Union Act 2011, precisely because contemporary patterns in
governance mean that there are unavoidable points of  intersection between national,
supranational and international norms.55 There is, in the result, a ‘divided sovereignty’ in the
UK whereby claims to the public interest can be made both from within and outwith the
domestic constitution.56
Public interest litigation and the three dimensions of judicial review
Many of  the above uses of  the public interest have been displayed in the context of  public
interest litigation in UK courts. Public interest litigation, for these purposes, has been
described above in terms of  liberal access to courts for pressure groups, representative
bodies and statutory organisations that wish either to bring proceedings in their own names
or to intervene as third parties in ongoing disputes.57 Within this, pressure groups etc. and
the courts may have different reasons for favouring public interest litigation, even if  their
reasons may overlap on the facts of  a given case. For instance, pressure groups and so on
may wish to bring, or intervene in, proceedings precisely because they claim to be acting on
a matter of  public interest such as the environment, poverty, or fundamental rights.58
However, while this links public interest litigation to wider policy areas and governmental
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51 R v Secretary of  State for Transport, ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. See, in respect of  the legislative
choices of  the devolved legislatures, Government of  Wales Act 2006, ss 94 and 108; Northern Ireland Act
1998, s 6; and Scotland Act 1998, s 29.
52 See generally P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text Cases and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) chs 5 and 6. And,
for an earlier account of  the EU’s processes, see A Moravcsik and A Sangiovanni, ‘On Democracy and “Public
Interest” in the European Union’ in W Streeck and R Mainz (eds), Die Reformierbarkeit der Demokratie.
Innovationen und Blockaden (Campus Verlag 2002) 122.
53 Compare Human Rights Act 1998, ss 3–4, and eg Representation of  the People Act 1983, ss 3–4; Hurst v UK
(No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41; and Smith v Scott (2007) CSIH 9.
54 Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2003] QB 151. For commentary on the Act, see P Craig, ‘The European Union Act
2011: Locks, Limits, and Legality’ (2011) 48 CMLR 1915 and M Gordon and M Dougan, ‘The United Kingdom’s
European Union Act 2011: “who won the bloody war anyway?”’ (2012) 37 ELRev 1.
55 The leading commentary on the point remains M Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart
Publishing 1997) chs 1–3; and for the patterns in governance see A Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and
the Constitution of  International Society (OUP 2007).
56 For the term ‘divided sovereignty’ see R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2006] 1 AC 262, 302 [102], Lord Steyn.
57 See further Kirby (n 6). For discussion of  what can constitute a ‘public interest group’, see JUSTICE/Public
Law Project, A Matter of  Public Interest: Reforming the Law and Practice on Interventions in Public Interest Cases
(JUSTICE/Public Law Project 1996) 8–9.
58 See J Miles, ‘Standing in a Multi-Layered Constitution’ in N Bamforth and P Leyland (eds), Public Law in a
Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart Publishing 2003) ch 15.
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choices that affect society or ‘the community’, the courts have emphasised that they
facilitate proceedings brought by pressure groups and so on because of  the need to ensure
that governmental decision makers act lawfully. Although this can give rise to controversy
when judicial decision-making fringes upon matters of  policy,59 the courts have noted that
there can be merit in constraining decision makers even in those cases where no individual
has been directly affected by a decision.60 On this (red-light) view, the public interest lies in
the rule of  law and a robust common law principle of  legality.
In terms of  the three dimensions of  judicial review, the move towards public interest
litigation has historically had its origins very much in the common law dimension. However,
as the European law and international law dimensions of  judicial review have become ever
more prominent, the dynamics that drive public interest litigation have changed. This has
been true not just in terms of  the matters of  the public interest that pressure groups and
so on may appeal to – fundamental rights and the environment again providing obvious
examples – but also in terms of  related demands about the need for pressure groups and
so on to have liberal access to the courts. It is thus here that the intersection of  norms is to
be found, and where global administrative law enjoys an explanatory force. 
the commoN LAw dImeNsIoN
The common law’s approach to public interest litigation centres upon procedural matters of
standing, costs and third-party interventions. In relation to standing, it is well known that
the courts have long interpreted the ‘sufficient interest’ requirement in judicial review
broadly and that groups such as the Child Poverty Action Group, Greenpeace and the
World Development Movement have enjoyed liberal access to the courts61 (some
organisations also have a statutory power to bring proceedings).62 This is where debate
about the role of  the courts has been at its most pronounced, as a liberal standing regime
has opened the courts to applications that may ultimately be motivated by broader policy
concerns rather than particular points of  law. While few would doubt that there is a moral
force to the causes associated with many pressure groups and so on, the doctrinal argument
is that such groups are partisan and that there will often be rational, competing views about
how to address the claimed matter of  public interest. For some commentators, the
inevitable concern is that the courts can thereby become a forum for disputes that a
procedural model of  the public interest would place elsewhere.63
Costs in the context of  public interest litigation are associated with so-called protective
costs orders (PCOs) that cap the liabilities of  applicants in proceedings which may
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(2)
59 See generally C Harlow, ‘Public Law and Popular Justice’ (2002) 65 MLR 1.
60 R v Somerset CC, ex p Dixon [1998] EnvLR 111, 121, Sedley J; and R v Secretary of  State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386, 395, Rose LJ.
61 See, respectively, R (Child Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of  State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWHC 2579
(Admin), [2012] ACD 109; R v HM Inspectorate of  Pollution, ex p Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329; and
R v Secretary of  State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386.
Compare, most famously, R v Secretary of  State for the Environment, ex p Rose Theatre Trust Co [1990] 1 QB 504.
For commentary, see P Leyland and G Anthony, Textbook on Administrative Law (7th edn, OUP 2013) 201–06;
and R Rawlings, ‘Modelling Judicial Review’ (2008) 61 CLP 95, 98–103. 
62 See eg Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 71(2A)–(2C), and Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application
[2012] NIQB 77. See too the powers of  the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the Equality Act 2006,
s 30, and eg R (Equality and Human Rights Commission) v Prime Minister [2011] EWHC 2401; [2012] 1 WLR 1389. 
63 Harlow (n 59); and J A G Griffiths, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1.
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otherwise be discontinued for financial reasons.64 As will be seen below, this is one area in
which there is a pronounced interplay between the three dimensions of  judicial review,
specifically in the context of  environmental proceedings. However, the common law itself
does not limit PCOs to the environmental setting, and they may be granted in any
proceedings that raise an issue of  ‘general public importance’ which ‘the public interest’
requires the court to hear (proceedings for these purposes may be brought either by a
representative body and so on, or by an individual).65 While these are not the sole criteria
that the courts consider on an application for a PCO – others include the respective
financial positions of  the parties; whether the applicant has any private interest in the
proceedings; and whether the applicant’s lawyers are acting on a pro bono basis66 – they are
an obvious correlate of  the law that has developed around standing. Indeed, to the extent
that it was initially thought that PCOs would issue only ‘exceptionally’, the Court of  Appeal
in England and Wales has since said that this is not an additional criterion and that the
judicial task in any case remains one of  isolating issues of  ‘general public importance’ that
are in the public interest.67 Whether that can be done is ‘a question of  degree and a question
which the … [case law] … would expect judges to be able to resolve’.68
Third-party, or public interest, interventions obviously engage pressure groups and so
on in a different, less costly exercise, as an intervener purports either to supplement the
arguments advanced by one of  the parties to the proceedings and/or to bring wider points
of  law to the attention of  the court.69 In this context, the partisan nature of  the intervener
should be less remarkable than it (potentially) is in respect of  standing, as the legal issues in
the case will have been identified by a private individual who has been affected by the
(in)action of  a public authority (unless, that is, the proceedings have been initiated by
another representative body).70 Whether interventions will be accepted is ultimately a
matter for the discretion of  the court71 – albeit that some groups enjoy a statutory power
to apply to intervene72 – and the judicial understanding is that an intervener’s ‘fund of
knowledge or particular point of  view will enable [it] to provide the [court] with a more
rounded picture than it would otherwise obtain’.73 This has been said to require that
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2624 [74].
66 Ibid. Although, on the issue of  private interest, see Re Thompson’s Application [2010] NIQB 38; and, on pro
bono representation in England and Wales, see the Legal Services Act 2007, s 194, and the Legal Aid,
Sentencing, and Punishment of  Offenders Act 2012, s 61.
67 R (Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust [2008] EWCA Civ 749, [2009] 1 WLR 1436, 1446 [24], Waller LJ.
68 Ibid; and for application, see eg R (Technoprint plc) v Leeds City Council [2009] EWHC 3832 (Admin). But
compare R (Action Against Medical Accidents) v General Medical Council [2009] EWHC 2522 (Admin).
69 Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2002] UKHL 25, [2002] NI 236 noting, among other things, the
different roles of  an intervener and amicus curiae. On interveners, see further M Fordham, ‘Public Interest
Interventions in the Supreme Court: Ten Virtues’ [2010] 15 JR 18; and JUSTICE/Public Law Project (n 57).
70 As in eg Family Planning Association of  Northern Ireland v Minister for Health, Social Services and Public Safety [2005]
NI 188, interventions made by, among others, the Roman Catholic Church and the Society for the Protection
of  the Unborn Child.
71 See eg RSC r 26.
72 Eg Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2002] NI 236 and Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 71(2B). See
too the Commissioner for Children and Young People (NI) Order 2003, art 14(1)(b).
73 Re E (A Child) [2008] UKHL 66, [2009] 1 AC 536, 542 [2], Lord Hoffmann. On the limitations of  traditional
inter partes proceedings, see J Allison, ‘The Procedural Reason for Judicial Restraint’ [1994] PL 452.
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interveners avoid mere repetition of  points which have already been made by the parties
and that they focus, instead, on additional matters that will assist the court.74
the eUroPeAN LAw dImeNsIoN
One area of  law in which interventions have featured particularly prominently – and which
marks a crossover between the common law and European law dimensions of  judicial
review – is that concerned with human rights.75 Although human rights proceedings can
also include arguments about fundamental rights at common law,76 the majority of  cases
are now heard under the Human Rights Act 1998 as read with the relevant provisions of
the ECHR.77 In that latter setting, public interest litigation has assumed a more truncated
meaning, as section 7 of  the Human Rights Act 1998 precludes actions by representative
bodies and so on save where they themselves are ‘victims’ within the meaning of  Article
34 ECHR or where statute permits such actions.78 That said, the fact that pressure groups
etc. are able to intervene as third parties allows them to make submissions about the
interface between national legislative and administrative choices and the body of  case law
that has been developed by the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR). While that
case law famously includes a ‘margin of  appreciation’ doctrine that gives national
authorities considerable latitude in their treatment of  qualified rights, interveners can still
address the normative importance of  rights and whether the ECHR recognises a public
interest justification for limiting rights in a particular case.79 In some instances,
interventions may influence a court towards the conclusion that even an Act of  the
Westminster Parliament cannot be reconciled with particular rights and that a ‘declaration
of  incompatibility’ should issue.80
Litigation within the rubric of  EU law is more complex, largely because of  the role that
the national courts play within the EU’s broader judicial architecture. Here, UK courts
perform an essentially dual function whereby they can hear public interest challenges to acts
of  the EU institutions as well as to national legislative and administrative choices that are
argued to contravene EU law. In terms of  challenges to acts of  the EU institutions, it is well
established that pressure groups etc. have only restricted rights of  access to the General
Court and that proceedings should instead be brought in national courts, which may
subsequently refer a matter of  legality to the Court of  Justice of  the European Union
(CJEU) under Article 267 TFEU.81 While this is a state of  affairs that has been much
criticised82 – the scope for direct actions has since also been partly liberalised by the Treaty
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(2)
74 Re E (A Child) [2008] UKHL 66, [2009] 1 AC 536, 542 [2], Lord Hoffmann. See too Re White’s Application
[2000] NI 432, 445.
75 See generally E Metcalfe, To Assist the Court: Third Party Interventions in the UK (JUSTICE 2009).
76 See eg Ahmed v HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 2 and 5, [2010] 2 AC 534, considered below.
77 See both Hickman and Dickson (n 39).
78 See eg Re Committee for the Administration of  Justice’s Application [2005] NIQB 25. For an example of  legislation
giving bodies the power to bring proceedings see Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 71(2A)–(2C), and Re Northern
Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2012] NIQB 77. 
79 But, for a critical account of  the ECtHR case law, see McHarg (n 41). 
80 Eg A v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68, declaration of
incompatibility between the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ss 23–24, and Arts 5 and 14 ECHR,
Liberty intervening.
81 T de la Mare and C Donnelly, ‘Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal Integration: Evolution and Stasis’ in P Craig
and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of  EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 363, 385–86. Direct actions are now
governed by Art 263(4) TFEU.
82 See, most tellingly, Advocate General Jacob’s Opinion in Case C-50/00 Unión de Peqeños Agricultores v Council
[2002] ECR I-6677.
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of  Lisbon83 – it corresponds with a constitutional arrangement whereby national courts
augment the work of  the CJEU and the principles it has developed.84 That arrangement
also informs the role that UK courts play when hearing challenges to national legislative and
administrative choices, where the supremacy and direct effect doctrines require that EU law
prevails over any conflicting norm of  national law.85 The resolution of  this latter type of
challenge may again require a national court reference to the CJEU under Article 267
TFEU,86 and it may at other times require that the national court engages in de facto review
of  the constitutionality of  Acts of  the Westminster Parliament.87 When engaged in review
of  that kind, the national court will essentially ask whether a deliberative choice of  the
Westminster Parliament is consistent with externally defined constitutional norms.88
The outstanding example of  such review in public interest proceedings remains R v
Secretary of  State for Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission89 (EOC). The EOC
here argued that various provisions of  the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act
1978 were contrary to some of  EU law’s non-discrimination rules because they granted
preferential employment protection rights to full-time workers, a majority of  whom were
men, as opposed to part-time workers, a majority of  whom were women. Granting the
application for judicial review, the House of  Lords held: that the EOC had had ‘sufficient
interest’ to bring the proceedings because of  its statutory duty to work towards the
elimination of  discrimination; that the seminal Factortame case had made possible the review
of  Acts of  the Westminster Parliament in the EU context; and that the Secretary of  State
had been unable to offer any objective justification for the discriminatory measures under
challenge. On this outcome, the common law’s open approach to standing elided with the
core doctrines of  EU law to produce a declaration that the Act of  1978 was incompatible
with EU law’s sex equality rules. 
the INterNAtIoNAL LAw dImeNsIoN
The nature of  the international law dimension can be illustrated with reference to the
Aarhus Convention that was noted, above, in the introduction. This is a Convention that is
of  application only within the broader European region (including at the level of  the EU)
but which was drafted under the auspices of  the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe (UNECE), drew inspiration from principle 10 of  the United Nation’s Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, and has been described as of  ‘global’
significance.90 Its central premise is the shared public interest in adequate protection of  the
environment, and it contains wide-ranging provisions on access to information on
environmental matters, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice where
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public authority decisions are under challenge.91 Within this, the role that pressure groups
etc. can play is explicitly recognised, albeit as subject to each party’s procedural rules on
standing,92 and the Aarhus Convention requires that remedies should be ‘adequate and
effective’ and access to them ‘fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive’.93
Questions of  adherence are overseen by a Compliance Committee that can act on a
submission that is made by a party to the Aarhus Convention, a referral that is received from
the Secretariat to UNECE, or a communication from a member of  the public (including a
pressure group).94
Implementation of  the Aarhus Convention in the UK has been achieved primarily
through the modification of  EU Directives and corresponding national implementing
measures.95 In terms of  its content, the ‘prohibitively expensive’ provision has given rise to
the most case law both in the UK courts themselves and, as regards the UK as a party to
the Aarhus Convention, before the Compliance Committee.96 Much of  that case law has
inevitably centred upon the domestic approach to PCOs and the Supreme Court recently
referred to the CJEU the question of  how ‘prohibitive expense’ is to be assessed. The issue
arose in Edwards,97 which was a challenge to a grant of  planning permission brought by a
third-party private individual who had applied unsuccessfully for a PCO in proceedings in
the House of  Lords and who then challenged a costs order against her when the appeal was
dismissed (the House of  Lords had in the meantime been replaced by the Supreme Court).
In considering how compliance with the Aarhus Convention was to be observed, the
Supreme Court noted the competing options presented by a wholly subjective approach to
costs (what can the applicant be expected to pay given his/her/its financial position?) as
opposed to a wholly objective approach (what might the ‘ordinary’ member of  the public be
expected to pay in the circumstances of  the case?). While Lord Hope thought that the
balance might ‘lie in favour of  the objective approach’,98 he was ultimately of  the view that
the law was uncertain and that the meaning of  the relevant Directives should be referred to
the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. The CJEU, in its ruling of  11 April 2013, stated that
the appropriate test should include elements of  both approaches.99
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Public interest litigation, legality and global administrative law
Edwards provides a clear example of  how the three dimensions of  judicial review can
coincide in public interest litigation, as the Aarhus Convention had prompted the
modification of  the EU Directives, which then raised issues about the nature of  PCOs in
national law. At its most obvious, that coincidence took form in the range of  legal
requirements on the protection of  the environment that the applicant relied upon when
bringing the proceedings on that matter of  public interest. However, the coincidence also
had a more complex quality that relates to the common law’s principle of  legality and the
courts’ emphasis on the public interest in vindicating the rule of  law. That point of
emphasis had already led to a liberal procedural regime in UK courts independent of  the
demands of  European law and international law, and the Aarhus Convention, in that sense,
did not entail any reinvention of  national principle and practice. Nevertheless, the fact that
Edwards involved the courts in enforcing rules of  law that had been formulated outside the
UK constitutional order also revealed how matters of  legality can be determined at the
intersection of  national, supranational and international norms. So, what is the nature of
the contemporary legality principle that may be involved in such public interest litigation?
And what is the role of  the common law principle of  legality in cases that transcend the
three dimensions of  judicial review? 
The approach that literature on global administrative law takes to such questions starts
from the premise that public power is exercised at a number of  cross-cutting levels in
contemporary society – mainly national, supranational and international – and that
corresponding legal constraints emerge from within the different legal orders at those
levels.100 Within that, the global administrative law thesis regards relations between the legal
orders as heterarchical in form, and it borrows from ‘constitutional pluralism’ when noting
a degree of  equivalence between the values that define the various orders.101 This clearly
departs from any account that would attribute a primary (hierarchical) role to international
law, and it posits a number of  interesting consequences that flow from the interaction of
norms. One is that global administrative law becomes inextricably linked to constitutional
values that exist in different legal orders and which include, most prominently, fundamental
rights standards.102 A second, admittedly exceptional, consequence is that there is scope for
one legal order to reject a norm that has originated in another order, for the reason that the
norm offends a constitutional value within the receiving system. This is famously – and
controversially – what happened in the Kadi case when the CJEU reviewed the legality of
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EU Regulations that implemented UN Resolutions that had been adopted without regard
for, among other things, fair hearing guarantees (the Resolutions provided for the freezing
of  the financial assets of  terror suspects whose names had been added to a sanctions list by
a UN Committee).103 While the CJEU was not competent to rule directly on the legality of
the UN Resolutions, it emphasised its role as the guardian of  values within the EU’s
constitutional space and on that basis held that the EU Regulations were invalid.104 This is
thus a third consequence of  constitutional pluralism: the emergence of  a legality principle
that can include an indirect judicial control of  decisions that have been taken beyond the
jurisdiction of  the court giving judgment.
Of  course, it is the nature and content of  that legality principle that is of  most interest
here. Normatively, the principle is grounded in global administrative law’s pursuit of  the
value of  accountability in global decision-making,105 where it emphasises the link between
the legitimacy of  decision-making and rule of  law requirements such as acting within powers,
due process, reason-giving, proportionality and fundamental rights.106 In a treaty-based
system, such requirements may be found in textual requirements and/or in general principles
of  law,107 and national courts may be obliged to review domestic legal acts with reference to
those treaty standards (which may have an extraterritorial effect).108 This is paradigmatic of
the role played by the national courts of  the EU’s member states, where an occasional
pluralist resistance to the demands of  the supranational order can be contrasted with a much
fuller acceptance of  EU law’s foundational doctrines and general principles of  law.109
However, it has also been noted that national court acceptance of  those principles – as well
as those in some other treaty systems – has been aided by the fact that many of  the principles
have been borrowed from the prior experience of  national administrative laws.110 Global
administrative law in that way recognises an historical role for national conceptions of
legality, as they will have helped to shape the legality principle that now exists in the
supranational and international settings. A contemporary role for national conceptions is
likewise envisaged in so far as they may interact with the legal norms of  other orders as a
result of  the many indirect, or incidental, linkages within the global polity.111 
Returning to Edwards, the legality principle that is involved in the case assumes a more
complex quality. Certainly, the account that would be offered by international law orthodoxy
– that the EU and UK were merely acting in the light of  their obligations under the Aarhus
Convention – would understate the significance of  common law (and European)
developments that pre-dated the Aarhus Convention’s ratification. The point here, again, is
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that common law approaches to matters of  standing, costs and interventions had already
emphasised the public interest in vindicating the rule of  law, where the relevant ‘rules of
law’ had included EU measures in the field of  the environment.112 While the Aarhus
Convention purported to embed liberal procedural regimes as a means for achieving more
effective protection of  the environment, its requirements arguably still did nothing more
than complement well-established common law practices. On this view, the common law
principle of  legality became an active facilitator of  international norms, rather than
something that was subsumed by them. 
The complexity of  the legality principle can also be seen in Ahmed v HM Treasury.113
This was a fundamental rights case in which JUSTICE intervened as a third party on the
question of  how the common law should protect rights. The specific issue in the case was
the legality of  Orders in Council that had been made under section 1 of  the United Nations
Act 1946 and which, as with the disputed EU Regulations in Kadi, gave effect to UN
Security Council Resolutions on the freezing of  the financial assets of  individuals involved
in terrorism. According to section 1 of  the Act, Orders in Council could make such
provision as appeared ‘necessary or expedient’ for the purposes of  implementing UN
Resolutions, and the government had thereby made the Terrorism (United Nations
Measures) Order 2006 (the Terrorism Order) and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations
Measures) Order 2006 (the Al-Qaida Order).114 The Terrorism Order was duly quashed by
the Supreme Court for the reason that it had included a test of  ‘reasonable suspicion’ about
an individual’s involvement in terrorism, which was held to have taken it beyond the
wording of  the corresponding UN Resolution and any argument that it had been ‘necessary
or expedient’ to include the test. However, more remarkable was the Supreme Court’s ruling
on the legality of  the Al-Qaida Order, where article 3(1)(b) had been challenged as contrary
both to the Human Rights Act 1998/ECHR and common law fundamental rights
standards. Under article 3(1)(b), individuals whose names had been added to the UN
sanctions list automatically had their assets frozen in the UK even though the UN listing
process did not observe minimum fair-hearing guarantees such as the right of  access to a
court. While the Supreme Court rejected the argument that this rendered article 3(1)(b)
unlawful under the Human Rights Act 1998 – the Court noted Article 103 of  the UN
Charter when holding that the ECHR was subject to the prior force of  UN Resolutions115
– it held that art 3(1)(b) was contrary to the common law’s legality principle. When doing
so, it referred to the interpretive rule whereby general words in an Act of  Parliament cannot
provide a basis for an interference with fundamental rights, as such interference can be
achieved only where Parliament uses express words to that effect or words that have that
effect by way of  necessary implication.116 Noting that s 1 of  the United Nations Act 1946
did not confer such a power upon the executive, the Supreme Court quashed article 3(1)(b)
given its proximity to a procedural regime that was lacking minimum fair-hearing
guarantees. The Supreme Court also refused a Treasury request for a suspension of  the
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remedies pending legislative amendment as that would ‘obfuscate the effect of  its judgment’
by suggesting that the relevant provisions were in some way valid.117
Ahmed was inevitably a controversial ruling and Parliament soon enacted primary
legislation that had the effect of  overriding it.118 Nevertheless, the case still provides an
insight into the robust nature of  the common law’s legality principle and its protection of,
in this instance, the right of  access to a court.119 Although the Supreme Court chose not to
situate its reasoning within the Human Rights Act 1998 and the analogical pluralism of  the
Kadi case – Kadi was read as specific to the EU legal order – its reliance on the common law
principle of  legality had essentially the same effect as the CJEU’s ruling. This thus marked
a common law limitation to the flow of  international norms and, even though the
subsequent parliamentary intervention removed that limitation, the principle of  legality
apparently also countenances the review of  an Act of  the Westminster Parliament. This is
the territory of  the Jackson case in which Lord Steyn famously cautioned that: ‘[I]n
exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary
role of  the courts . . . [judges] may have to consider whether this is a constitutional
fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of  a complaisant House
of  Commons cannot abolish.’120 Marched to its logical conclusion, this would suggest that
it is the common law principle of  legality that lies at the very heart of  the UK constitution,
and that the principle’s global relevance should be seen in that light. 
An equally controversial case – albeit for very different reasons – was R (Corner House
Research) v Director of  the Serious Fraud Office.121 The claimant was here given standing to
challenge a decision of  the Director whereby he had discontinued an investigation into
allegations of  corruption in BAE System’s dealings with officials in Saudi Arabia. The
investigation had been commenced on the basis of  the Director’s powers under section 1(3)
of  the Criminal Justice Act 1987 as read with sections 108–10 of  the Anti-terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001 (the latter provisions giving effect to the UK’s obligations under the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on
Combatting Bribery of  Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
1997).122 As the investigation progressed, the Saudi authorities made an explicit threat that
they would withdraw cooperation with the UK on matters of  anti-terrorism, and there were
very real concerns within the UK government that this would put ‘British lives on British
streets’ at risk.123 The Director’s decision to discontinue was therefore taken with reference
to ‘the public interest’ in ‘public safety’, and Corner House challenged that decision with
reference to the competing public interest in upholding the rule of  law. The claimant’s
arguments were to succeed in the Divisional Court, which held that the Director had acted
unlawfully by, in effect, surrendering his discretion in the face of  the Saudi threat. However,
the House of  Lords allowed the Director’s appeal for reasons associated with the separation
of  powers doctrine. Having noted the breadth of  the discretion that is generally entrusted
to public prosecutors under UK law, the House of  Lords emphasised the limited role that
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the courts should play when decisions are challenged by way of  judicial review.124 The
House also noted that the facts of  the case had placed the Director in an ‘impossible
situation’ and that he had been entitled, in law, to make the decision to discontinue.125 As
Lord Bingham expressed it: 
The Director was confronted by an ugly and obviously unwelcome threat. He
had to decide what, if  anything, he should do . . . The issue in these proceedings
is not whether his decision was right or wrong . . . but whether it was a decision
which the Director was lawfully entitled to make . . . In the opinion of  the House
the Director’s decision was one he was lawfully entitled to make. It may indeed
be doubted whether a responsible decision-maker could, on the facts before the
Director, have decided otherwise.126
There are perhaps two ways in which Corner House can be assessed. The first is to criticise it
for equating the public interest in the rule of  law with matters such as public safety, as this
diminishes the prior normative force of  the legality principle. This is certainly a view that
has been advanced in some commentary on the case127 and, cast in terms of  global
administrative law, it might be said that Corner House detracted from the value of
accountability that underlies the OECD Convention on Bribery. However, a second view
would hold that the restraint that characterised the House of  Lords ruling is to be
welcomed as it is as elemental to the legality principle as is judicial intervention in
appropriate cases. The point here, again, is that public interest litigation has the potential to
‘politicise’ the courts by requiring them to adjudicate on matters that will involve difficult
value judgEments and the mobilisation of  political knowledge.128 On this more benign
reading, Corner House amounts to nothing other than a reminder that global administrative
law itself  needs to accommodate a separation of  powers doctrine. 
conclusion
This article began by noting that the term ‘the public interest’ occupies a central – if  
ill-defined – place in judicial review in the UK. Its corresponding analysis of  public interest
litigation across the three dimensions of  judicial review has shown that UK courts now give
effect to a legality principle that can both constrain decision makers within the UK and have
implications for those outside it. While the genesis of  the case law has been found very
much in the common law’s approach to matters of  standing, costs, and third-party
interventions, it has been seen that the European and international law dimensions can also
encourage – and, in some instances, demand – liberal access to the courts. This has resulted
in cases coming before the courts where the points of  law at issue have transcended the
three dimensions of  judicial review and required the courts to elaborate upon the
requirements of  legality in an era of  global governance. When doing so, the courts have
revealed much about the role that they might play in developing legal principles within an
emerging body of  global administrative law.
Of  course, much of  this presupposes the legitimacy of  the link that the courts have
made between ‘the public interest’ and the ‘rule of  law’, and this is where criticisms of  the
case law may remain. Certainly, the fact that pressure groups and so on may associate the
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public interest with particular policy preferences weakens the idea that public interest
litigation will always be synonymous solely with the rule of  law. Moreover, where pressure
groups and so on rely upon European law and/or international law to challenge measures
that may include Acts of  the Westminster Parliament, this raises related concerns about how
such norms are formulated and why they should prevail over deliberative choices that have
been taken at the national level. This is largely a concern about the impact of  elitism above
the level of  the state,129 and it resonates with a much wider critique about the need for a
revised, post-national model of  democracy in a globalised era.130 That said, global
administrative law arguably offers some means for achieving accountability and control in
that era, and it engages the UK courts both directly and indirectly in that endeavour. While
there will always be scope for debate about whether judicial intervention is merited in a
particular case – Corner House providing but one example – there can surely be no dispute
about the imperative nature of  the judicial review function. Any other perspective would
only threaten the rule of  law as a defining constitutional value.131
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